

TRANSFORMING FROM A SERVICE-CENTRIC TO A JOINT RECRUITING ENVIRONMENT

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

TRANSFORMING FROM A SERVICE-CENTRIC TO A JOINT RECRUITING ENVIRONMENT

by

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This paper evaluates the current recruiting environment among all of the services within Department of Defense (DoD). During the past ten years, DoD has successfully transformed the military and rewritten several doctrinal manuals as the military continues combating terrorism. Service members understand the philosophy of thinking and fighting in a joint environment; however, that is not the case in recruiting. When service members are assigned to recruiting duty, all services revert back to the pre Goldwater-Nichols Act days and become service-centric with a narrow vision. Why does DoD recruit with a service-centric mindset? Why does DoD have separate headquarters to command and control each recruiting service? Why do the services try to outperform each other in the form of advertisement through commercials? Why does DoD inundate high schools, colleges, malls, fairs, and sporting events with up to six different service recruiters? The answer is simple; military recruiting is not a joint operation. This paper will conclude with several enabling actions to support a smooth transition from a service-centric recruiting environment to a fully joint recruiting environment.

TRANSFORMING FROM A SERVICE-CENTRIC TO A JOINT RECRUITING ENVIRONMENT

The very basis of our system is that every citizen who enjoys the protection of a free Government owes not only a portion of his property, but even of his personal services to the defense of it.

—George Washington, 1783

This paper evaluates the current recruiting environment among all of the services within DoD. Service members understand the philosophy of thinking and fighting in a joint environment; however, that is not the case in recruiting. When service members are assigned to recruiting duty, all services revert back to the pre Goldwater-Nichols Act days and become service-centric with a narrow vision. Recruiting with a service-centric mindset, having separate headquarters to command and control each recruiting service, and constantly trying to outperform each other in the form of advertisement through commercials does nothing to strengthen a joint mindset, nor does it advance successful unity of effort or command. Why do recruiters inundate high schools, colleges, malls, fairs, and sporting events with up to six different service recruiters? The answer is simple; military recruiting is not a joint operation. Just from a fiscal position, the benefits of recruiting within a joint recruiting environment would save millions of dollars. Decisions have been made at the strategic level regarding recruiting that run counter to how the military services train, deploy and conduct combat operations in a joint environment at the operational and tactical level. This paper will conclude with several enabling actions to support a smooth transition from a service-centric recruiting environment to a fully joint recruiting environment.

Background on the All-Volunteer Force (AVF)

The All-Volunteer Force (AVF) has been a remarkable success for the past thirty-seven years. The United States has benefited by having young men and women who have willingly answered the call to serve within the military ranks. Today's service members joined willingly, and were not forced to enlist. They answered the call to duty with the understanding that a nation must have professional service members who are trained and equipped to fight and win the nation's wars.

In recent years, the AVF fought outstandingly in Panama, Grenada, Somalia, and the Balkans. Today the AVF is proudly deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Haiti, the Horn of Africa, and numerous other locations throughout the world. For the past ten years and counting, the AVF has been engaged in the longest protracted war to date in the nation's history -- fought exclusively by volunteers.

In fact, no major war in the United States history has been fought with a smaller percentage of this country's citizens -- roughly 2.4 million active and reserve service members, out of a country of over 300 million, represents less than one percent that have served.¹ Citizens from all walks of life continue to step forward and answer the call to serve in spite of more than five thousand killed in action and more than twenty thousand wounded while deployed in both Iraq and Afghanistan.² Today's military leaders have enjoyed leading service members who have freely enlisted with the desire to be part of a professional organization.

At the end of 2009, more than 1.4 million people were on active duty—about 561,000 in the Army, 327,000 in the Navy, 325,000 in the Air Force, and 202,000 in the Marine Corps. In addition, more than 1 million people served in the Reserve

components of the Air and Army National Guard and 41,000 individuals served in the Coast Guard, which is now part of the Department of Homeland Security.³

In this new age of persistent conflict, and with all of the services making their end recruiting goals, it is very safe to say that the AVF has been a success.

Let us face that future with the same resolve our men and women in uniform exhibit...America has sent her armed forces forward...Many of them, more than 1 million, have enlisted after 9/11. Because of 9/11, they volunteered to defend their country, to fight for something bigger than themselves.⁴

However, this was not the case until 1973. To understand why DoD has an AVF requires a modest background as to why the nation went from a conscript service to an AVF.

Even before the nation's existence, the military draft has been a very delicate topic that has been immersed with disagreement and debate. Since the American Revolution, the nation drafted men to serve during the Civil War, World War I, and World War II.⁵ During the American Revolution, states provided units with extended enlistment periods to support the newly formed Continental Army. The unresolved issue of how to best organize and maintain a standing Army would be left with the new, post-revolutionary democracy.⁶ As the nation fought for its independence from Great Britain in the 18th century, George Washington saw the draft as a "disagreeable" but necessary "alternative" in providing personnel to sustain the Army. He and civilian leaders were forced to implement the draft when volunteerism failed.⁷ George Washington's answer to manning the Army was that of a federal militia. His idea was that all citizens should be responsible for participating in the defense of the Republic.⁸

In 1969, President Richard Nixon appointed a commission to look into whether the nation could formally end the draft and begin a new era where a volunteer military

would be the preferred way of manning the military.⁹ Many argued that a voluntary Army manned by professional service members who had chosen to enlist would produce a lower turnover within the services as opposed to reluctant conscripts who avoided or waited out their terms of duty.¹⁰

Another argument was the concern about fairness, “Why should some be deferred and remain safely at home while others were exposed to the danger of death and disfigurement abroad?”¹¹

In April 1970, President Nixon approved the finding and recommendations of the Gates Commission to abolish the draft in favor of the AVF. In 1973, there were at least five reasons to end the draft and move to an AVF.¹²

- Norm throughout American history has been a volunteer force (The nation has only used the draft four times).
- Size of the eligible population exceeded the needs of the military.
- Vietnam War was unpopular (Draft calls increased and deferments were cancelled).
- Moral obligation to serve.
- Discipline issues among draftees in Vietnam.

However, to support a smooth transition the implementation was deferred until 1 July 1973.¹³ The results of the commission’s study found that the labor market, to include economic factors, supported that the nation could raise a military that was all volunteer.¹⁴

Since the inception of the AVF more than 12 million young men and women have volunteered to serve. The AVF has been a resounding success and continues to

exceed the expectations of its framers.¹⁵ It is safe to say that the AVF has served the nation well and to revert back to a draft as a means of manning the military would be a mistake. However, DoD needs to amend the methods in how the military attracts and enlists applicants due to budgetary constraints.

President Obama, warned us that this and future generations will have to bear the heavy burden of making sacrifices as we repair the economy, balance overspent health care, restore declining job rates, and reduce business closures.¹⁶ In essence, strategic leaders will have to make tough fiscal decisions in the future if the United States is going to remain a superpower.

Recently, Defense Secretary Gates directed that each service find savings totaling \$28 billion over the next four years. Each service will be allowed to retain the savings and fund military pay, benefits, and weapons acquisition programs.¹⁷ At the strategic level there is growing concern of the financial cost associated with an AVF by rising health costs, pay raises, wartime recruiting, and retention bonuses has nearly doubled, from roughly \$90 billion in 2001 to just over \$170 billion this year out of a \$534 billion budget.¹⁸ As good stewards, it is paramount that DoD identify cost savings and reevaluate the policies of acquiring military manpower in support of the AVF.

Military Service Recruiting Commands & FY10 Accomplishments

During Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 all four Active Component and five of the six Reserve Component Services met or exceeded their numeric accession goals. The Army National Guard intentionally achieved only 95 percent in order to stay within its congressionally authorized end strength.¹⁹ For FY 2010, DoD Active forces had 165,291 accessions, making 100 percent of their 165,000 goal; while DoD Reserve forces had 117,347 accessions, making 101 percent of their 116,262 goal.²⁰ Likewise, for the

second consecutive year since the inception of the AVF, all four Active Services not only met their numerical goals, but also exceeded the DoD recruit quality benchmarks.²¹ The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Clifford Stanley, recently played down the poor economy's effect on recruiting at a recent Pentagon press briefing by noting that 99% of all enlistees in FY 2010 hold high school diplomas.²² As DoD enters FY 2011, each of the services is well on the mark of making or exceeded their assigned goals. Figure 1 shows for the past 25 years that all active services have exceeded recruit quality benchmarks.²³




Figure 1: DoD Active-duty Accession Quality Benchmark

The United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) located at Fort Knox, Kentucky, is composed of five Recruiting Brigades and 41 Recruiting Battalions. More than 230 companies provide tactical control of approximately 1,600 recruiting stations.²⁴


In total, USAREC includes approximately 9,249 active duty, 2,004 reserve, and 1,709 civilian personnel who recruit officers and enlisted members to meet the demands of the United States Army.²⁵ For FY 2010, the Active Army had 74,577 accessions, making 101 percent of its 74,500 goal; the Army Reserve had 17,046 accessions, making 103 percent of its 17,000 goal.²⁶

The Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) is located at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia and has approximately 3,100 Marine Corps Recruiters operating out of 48 Recruiting Stations, 574 Recruiting Sub-Stations, 6 Prior Service Recruiting Stations, 19 Prior Service Recruiting Sub-Stations, and 71 Officer Selection Sites.²⁷ For FY 2010, the Active Marine Corps had 28,041 accessions, making 100 percent of its 28,000 accession goal; the Marine Reserve had 10,077 accessions, making 125 percent of its 8,043 goal.²⁸

The Air Force Recruiting Service (AFRS), located at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, is composed of three Groups and 24 Squadrons. In total, AFRS includes approximately 2,519 active-duty and 307 civilian personnel who recruit officers and enlisted members needed to meet the diverse demands of America's expeditionary Air Force.²⁹ For FY 2010, the Active Air Force had 28,493 accessions, making 100 percent of its 28,360 goal; the Air Force Reserve had 9,604 accessions, making 105 percent of its 9,135 goal.³⁰

The Navy Recruiting Center (NRC) is located in Millington, Tennessee, and is composed of two Navy Recruiting Regions and 26 Navy Recruiting Districts. Today, nearly 7,200 active and reserve military, civilian and contract employees make up the command.³¹ For FY 2010, the Active Navy had 34,180 accessions, making 100 percent

of its 34,140 goal; the Navy Reserve had 6,669 accessions, making 100 percent of its 6,654 goal.³²



Source: GAO analysis based on service-provided organizational structures.

Figure 2: Service Recruiting Command Organizational Chart³³

As depicted in Figure 2, there is lack of unity of effort and command as military recruiters are assigned to recruiting service-centric command. Likewise, the separate infrastructures, operations, maintenance, and Government Operated Vehicle (GOV) fleets to support the service recruiting commands are wasteful and should be consolidated. The use of individual routers and switches to link the recruiting stations back to higher headquarters, applicants, and the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) is costly, not to mention that each service has its own unique software applications that are not interoperable with the other services. In addition, the duplication of efforts to maintain the network and to oversee personnel and budget support to the recruiters in the field is uneconomical and inefficient.

Prospecting & Advertising

Today's recruiting environment is service-centric with duplication of efforts as opposed to one single joint recruiting effort. On any given day at our high schools and colleges between two to three different service recruiters make the following inquiries to guidance counselors, students, and teachers throughout America: status of high school transcripts, permission to give classroom presentations, status by name of students that are in jeopardy of failing their senior year, post high school graduation plans, and asking guidance counselors for the contact information on junior and seniors assigned to the high school. For example, when one high school student was asked by a reporter whether he had ever talked to a military recruiter he replied: "To get to lunch in my high school, you had to pass recruiters," he said. "It was overwhelming." Then he added, "I thought the recruiters had too much information about me. They called me, but I never gave them my phone number."³⁴

During 2009, the DoD employed 27,000 people just for recruitment, advertising and public relations — almost as many as the total 30,000-person work force in the State Department.³⁵ Likewise, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Budget Estimates is \$1.6 billion for recruiting and advertising.³⁶ "We have such a massive apparatus selling the military to us, it has become hard to ask questions about whether this is too much money or if it's bloated," says Sheldon Rampton, research director for the Committee on Media and Democracy, which tracks the military's media operations."³⁷

Case in point, the military budget allocates thousands of dollars each weekend to support four race cars that are sponsored by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Army National Guard.³⁸ The return on investment is hard to determine for race cars with military logos painted on them, to say nothing of the amount of time service members

spend at the race. If, at the strategic level, the decision has been made to support National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR), why not take the millions of dollars that are spent on four cars and have just one race car that is painted with all of the services' logos?³⁹ As far as service members recruiting at races, representatives from each service could send the correct message that would resonate throughout the city hosting the race by appearing and recruiting jointly. As the DoD budget receives more attention and scrutiny, it is paramount that DoD recruits within a joint environment with one joint voice with a greater emphasis in justifying the millions of dollars spent on NASCAR.

Rep. Betty McCollum, D-Minn., wants to pull funding for the Defense Department's motorsports marketing enterprise, despite longstanding NASCAR ties with the U.S. military and the large overlap between states where the sport is popular and those that have high populations of service personnel. It's just a waste of money," McCollum chief of staff Bill Harper told *National Journal*...A complete waste of taxpayer money. The military shouldn't be in the business of sponsoring race cars, they should be in the business of fighting wars. Harper said the Army spent \$7 million on NASCAR endorsements, down from \$11.6 million in 2009, and another \$5 million on drag racing.⁴⁰

As with NASCAR, the same service-centric mindset exists at recruiting events hosted by the National Hot Rod Association (NHRA). Tony Schumacher is a remarkable driver and role model for the United States Army who became the first to top 330 mph, and is also the first driver in NHRA history to win six consecutive championships.⁴¹ NHRA is very popular with auto racing fans. Second only to NASCAR in terms of attendance, fan appeal, and sponsorship commitment, NHRA is moving quickly into mainstream America.⁴² As for recruiting events, the recruiters and possible applicants have direct access to the teams, and watch from as close as five or ten feet as highly skilled mechanics work on the race cars with drivers close by. Each race has a lunch

sponsored by the USAREC where future Soldiers, possible future applicants, and key senior leaders attend the luncheon with Tony Schumacher as the key note speakers. Likewise, it's a weeklong event where high schools and media events occur with the driver and local recruiters.

One other key recruiting event sponsored by USAREC is the U. S. Army All-American Bowl. The U.S. Army All-American Bowl is held at San Antonio's Alamo dome, and features an unmatched collection of college and NFL stars showcasing their talents for a national television audience.⁴³ Joining the All-American players along on the field is the U.S. Army All-American Marching Band, comprised of 125 of the nation's finest young musicians who perform at halftime with thousands in attendance and millions more watching on the television⁴⁴ Activities throughout Bowl Week help connect these All-American athletes and musicians with Soldiers to gain a better understanding of what it means to serve in the military. The history and tradition is unparalleled, highlighted by Heisman Trophy winners and more than 100 current NFL players counted among the Bowl's alumni.⁴⁵ Looking back on the extraordinary players and incredible moments, each of the previous U.S. Army All-American Bowls has provided thousands in attendance and millions more watching on television.⁴⁶

All of the military services participate in similar recruiting events across the nation from professional sporting events, college sporting events, high school sporting events, county fairs, job fairs, college fairs, and concerts. However, the events are planned and conducted in a service-centric mindset versus a joint mindset. Likewise, NASCAR, NHRA, U.S. Army All-American Bowls, and other service recruiting events have an associated cost involved for booth space, hotel cost, and transportation fees.

Current Cost & Proposed Savings

As depicted in Figure 3, the total DoD recruiting funding for FY 2010 was \$1.4 billion. Specifically, this cost included Operation and Maintenance, (OMA), Advertising and Marketing, Military Training, Automated Data Processing (ADP), and Recruiting Facility lease cost. As an estimate, after transformation, the first two years would yield zero gains as moving to a joint recruiting environment would require minimal cost to flatten out the service centric organizations and further merge four communication architectures to one domain, However, during the third year fiscal year, estimate gains would begin at 10% (\$1.4 million) and with continued oversight would be expected to reach 20% after the fifth year.⁴⁷

	<u>FY 2010 Total Funding</u>	<u>FY 2010 Marking & Advertisement</u>
Active Army	689.6	343.9
Army Reserve	52.5	48.8
Active Marine	240.5	98.8
Marine Reserve	8.7	5.3
Active Air Force	136.6	69
Air Force Reserve	24.4	9.8
Active Navy	253.9	188.9
Navy Reserve	<i>Receive funds from Active Navy</i>	<i>Receive funds from Active Navy</i>
Total FY 2010	1406.2	764.5
Total Savings For FY 2013	<i>10% Savings: 140.62 The first two years would yield zero net due to reorganization</i>	<i>10% Savings: 76.45 The first two years would yield zero net due to reorganization</i>

Figure 3: FY 2010 DoD Funding for Services' Recruiting & Total Savings gain from transforming to a Joint Recruiting Environment⁴⁸

Recommended Changes

The following phases include several recommendations to support a smooth transition from a service-centric recruiting environment to a joint operational recruiting environment. This topic has been researched on several occasions with the

recommended changes largely ignored by those involved at every level. It is incumbent upon strategic decision policy makers to stop the duplication of efforts with advertising and prospecting, and flatten the recruiting services' organizational commands. The time is right to reform, rethink, and rewrite the policy at the strategic level that enables success at both the operational and tactical levels within recruiting. It makes sense to recruit with one voice, one theme, and within one joint recruiting command. The increased efficiency and effectiveness will directly impact recruiters' quality of life, reduce advertising and marketing costs, and lessen the stress on the American public and possible applicants as DoD transforms with a unified and joint approach in recruiting operations.

Phase 1: (Shaping Operations) DOTMLPF Strategic Framework

In the 21st century, senior leaders reach decisions on strategic change using a framework of categories including Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF).⁴⁹

The framework ensures that all facets of change are considered and planned as organizational change occurs. DoD is constantly faced with strategic decisions on how to develop and position military forces for success in the joint operating environment (JOE) and for the future.⁵⁰ Former Chief of Staff of the Army General Carl Vuono coined the term DOTLMS to assist the Army in defining its mission in broad but specific terms. What came to be known as the "Six Imperatives" were, put simply, "Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leader Development, Materiel, and Soldiers," or DOTLMS for short.⁵¹ The Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted the term as well and modified it to meet the needs of the joint community.

DoD must integrate efforts and stop overlapping them as DoD recruits for tomorrow's AVF. Within the framework of DOTLMLPF, DoD must ensure that all facets of the imperatives are reviewed and updated as the services move to a joint recruiting environment.

Phase 2 (Shaping Operations) Strategic Leader Involvement in Overcoming Change

Leaders at all levels throughout the military tend to resist change for many reasons. It is the responsibility of senior strategic leaders to educate the workforce as to why change is taking place. This phase outlines three reasons why the service-centric recruiting environment would resist changing to a joint recruiting environment: 1) not understanding the need for change, 2) heritage, and 3) complacency. This phase ends with recommended suggestions for overcoming these sources of resistance as they relate to changing the recruiting environment.

Not understanding the need for change is one reason for resisting change. Some argue, "If it is not broke—why break it?" A viable strategic communications plan is a key solution to assist and train members who do not understand the need for change. The plan must have rationale and detail for changing recruiting policy and procedures. The strategic communication plan must be executed simultaneously internally and externally within the Department of Defense (DOD) and America. Having an integrated approach would require a major shift in thinking, and requires strategic leaders to properly inform and obtain buy-in from both military members and the American public with a detailed strategic communications plan. This plan would assist in cultivating change, both internally and externally, within DoD and the AVF recruiting environment.

The internal plan must address the most pressing issues. The audience should not be limited to the recruiting environment and must include all levels with any impacts or concerns about military recruiting.

One topic of discussion that must be addressed and explained is the budget. At the strategic level, it is paramount that military requirements are developed and justified based on realistic needs. The struggle for limited resources demands clear validation and strict adherence to the DoD planning, programming, budgeting and execution (PPBE) process. Similarly, strategic leaders have an obligation and duty to provide candid assessments and budgeting alternatives.⁵² Since the internal audience represents all the services, the themes and sound bites must remain jargon free and kept simple as the audience will vary within the different organizations impacted.⁵³

The external plan must address the audience including: stakeholders, retired military, media, civic leaders, teachers, high school principals, and government officials. Strategic leaders must be able to share the vision of where the enterprise is going.

The term 'vision' suggests that a core element is a *visual image*—a mental picture of what the future enterprise or environment will look like. The concept also implies a longer time horizon. This time horizon tends to be middle to long-term in nature (five to twenty years).⁵⁴

Likewise, strategic communications must be massed and synchronized along all elements of the public information domain. This will ensure that the right message is sent at the right time with the intent that no mixed signals are transmitted.⁵⁵

In today's joint operational environment, there is no alternative but to channel information and use it as a means to protect and promote interests through the means of radio, media, internet, and periodicals.⁵⁶

Heritage is one of many major sources of resistance to change within the military. As military leaders become more senior, with decades of heritage behind them, they often resist change due to the concern that generations of history will be forgotten. Some may fear that they are losing part of their identity and existence, as they both are united and connected with heritage.

As a case in point, within the United States Army Recruiting Command, (USAREC), Soldiers earn badges and rings by achieving different milestones. By moving to a joint recruiting environment, many would argue transformational changes would erode lineage and historical traditions would go away.

So how do the services retain their heritage within a joint recruiting environment? Leaders must explain they will begin a new chapter and rewrite their history together as one team; all involved can have a positive impact in the rich legacy and future of joint recruiting. Overcoming the inherent division between the service recruiters should be presented in a positive light to all involved.

Complacency is another source of resistance to change within the military. When strategic leaders fail to provide clear vision with objectives, timelines, and tasks that are clearly articulated and nested within a military organization, they inherently cause service members to become complacent hoping senior leaders change the plans and cease the transformation. Organizations without clear vision and clearly understood strategy are doomed from the outset as they have no guidance or azimuth to direct them as transformation takes place.

Overcoming complacency is straightforward. First, successful strategic leaders must ensure their message is clear, concise, meaningful, and understood by “giving it

meaning” to ensure the message resonates and most importantly that the message is actionable.⁵⁷ Another major flaw in overcoming complacency is by changing organizational behavior without establishing a sense of urgency in fellow leaders and subordinates, with clearly understood objectives.⁵⁸ Senior leaders must provide clear guidance with metrics and timelines. Senior leaders cannot be derelict in carrying out their assigned duties and must hold their members accountable; adhere to directives while change occurs.

As with all change, there will be resistance and the desire to protect one’s own personal and professional interests. The guidance is very clear from the Secretary of Defense to each Service Chief to find ways to reduce cost. The time has come to take the AVF to the next level and to recruit jointly. Mergers take place all the time within the private and corporate world and merging recruiting efforts is a smart joint business practice.

For an organization to truly change with a new vision requires a shift in perspective. Senior leaders must be able to articulate the reason for change and to educate and re-train service members with a new perspective.⁵⁹

As in most new concepts, the fear of the unknown is expected. To counter this, a viable strategic communications plan must be executed to assist and create an environment that allows an open two-way dialogue. Many strategic leaders believe that the DoD environment is one of bureaucracy, and thus accept the behaviors and norms associated with this environment as natural and appropriate instead of challenging the accepted norms and business practices.⁶⁰ Service parochialism can prevent innovation

and must be countered with historical examples of how change successfully benefited recruiting.


Phase 3: (Shaping Operations) Strategic Policy Changes

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has the authority by law to advise the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) on military requirements, training, programs, and budget changes to ensure that military efforts are integrated.⁶¹ With this authority, the CJCS should then articulate to the SecDef and the service chiefs why change is needed to reduce the recruiting budget and transform the recruiting environment within one joint command.

The first recommended policy change starts with Joint Publication 1, the capstone publication of US joint doctrine. As such, it is a bridge between policy and doctrine. Joint doctrine presents fundamental principles to guide the employment of US military forces in coordinated and integrated action toward a common objective.⁶² The change will need to address how all services will train, recruit, and work as one joint team in support of manning the AVF.

The second recommended policy change that must occur is to add within Joint Publication 1 that the CJCS, with J1 and J7 oversight would assume executive agent responsibilities to oversee the transformation from the services to a joint recruiting environment.

The third recommend policy change that must occur is to amend the Title 10 responsibilities from the services to a joint recruiting command and amend Joint Pub 1.



Source: GAO analysis of service-provided recruiting process depictions.

Figure 4: The Recruiting Process⁶³

Phase 4: (Decisive Operations) Team Recruiting

Everything service members do within the military is planned, rehearsed, and executed as a team. However, with the exception of USAREC, all other services task individual recruiters to accomplish monthly quotas versus tasking a station, region, or district. Within USAREC, the 3rd Recruiting Brigade, located at Fort Knox, Kentucky has led the way in innovation and change with the implementation of Team Recruiting (TR). TR is used within USAREC to enforce teamwork and unity of effort to assist in the transformation to a joint recruiting environment. The team will either win or lose in accomplishing its assigned monthly mission. By its nature, it enforces teamwork, cohesion, and camaraderie. In the past, each individual recruiter received a monthly requirement based on the higher headquarters mission. With TR, each recruiting station has Soldiers that solely perform the tasks and duties as prospectors, processors, Future Soldier Squad Leaders, and Fire Team Leaders. In other military service stations as depicted in figure 4, the individual service member is tasked to make appointments, conduct appointments, and (once the applicant passes the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)) make an appointment at the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) to select a job and the length of contract. Afterwards, the recruiter's

sole purpose is to ensure that the Future Soldier (FS) remains healthy, drug free, and eligible to attend Basic Training. All other military services have the same procedures in military recruiting. The difference between TR and legacy recruiting is that each individual recruiter has different duties and roles based on their individual strengths and weaknesses.

Feedback from Soldiers assigned to TR indicates that the team mission concept and the team leader position offers a better climate to foster and develop recruiters and the most effective leaders embraced TR.⁶⁴ The concept of teams being assigned a monthly mission versus an individual mission recruiter is a step in the right direction and the organization of groups of recruiters into teams aligns with traditional Army organizations.⁶⁵ Likewise, this gives flexibility to each leader in assigning roles and missions that support accomplishing the team's monthly mission.⁶⁶ This option allows for the merger from a service-centric recruiting to a team recruiting environment that fosters teamwork during the early stages of the merger.

The analysis of all TR stations has found a decrease in drug alcohol test losses, recruiter improprieties, training base attrition, future soldier losses, and fraudulent enlistments due to the team concept of maintaining honor and integrity within the team.⁶⁷

The team concept and operating in a joint environment is nothing new to DoD. The Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) fittingly requires each service to operate in a joint environment as integrated teams versus operating independently.⁶⁸

Conclusion

The key to a successful transformation is a thorough review of the DOTLMPF as well as local tests and rehearsals conducted prior to 100% conversion from a service-centric recruiting environment to a joint recruiting operational environment.

As good stewards of the nation's resources, everyone has an obligation to spend wisely to ensure that the long-term health of the institution is preserved as we carry out all military duties in a professional selfless manner.⁶⁹ Likewise, strategic leaders have a moral obligation inherent within the assigned duties to share the burden of working in a joint environment as service members cross service cultural boundaries and engage with one another as military and civilian professionals.⁷⁰

In summary, DoD is overspending with duplication of efforts as all services continue to send the wrong message to future applicants when recruiters attempt to outperform each other in filling the ranks of the AVF. There will always be resistance and the desire to protect the interest of one's service. This guidance is simple and straightforward: 1) find ways to reduce cost and 2) stop the replication of effort. Strategic leaders have a moral obligation to exercise their strategic duties as a joint team with unity of efforts to save tax dollars as well as to reduce perceived tension amongst recruiters.

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